Introduction
More than twenty years ago, Levy-Leblond (1992) argued for a more nuanced study of the relationship between science and scientists, and the 'public'. He pointed out that 'the public', accept and use complex science and technology -driving vehicles, interacting with computers and using sophisticated domestic appliances -regardless of any Public Understanding of Science (PUS) programmes. That, since 1992, 'the public' has become overwhelmingly IT literate further strengthens the point; people are generally capable of adapting to the changes of a technoscientific society with ease. Further still, citizens today think about themselves through scientific lenses. Nelkin and Lindee (1995) show how people reflect on their appearance and manner as genetic. This is not to say that, when it comes to science and technology, efforts to inform and engage 'the public' are not important, but to stress the necessity of more critical approaches. Levy-Leblond ends his discussion by asking whether we should supplement studies of the public understanding of science, with studies of scientists' understanding of the public (see Wynne, 1993) .
Studies of scientists' understanding of the public have been conducted since LevyLeblond's editorial. Few now treat 'scientist' as a single category, as it is widely recognised that with scientific communities being culturally, as well as practically, different, such lumping together of a wide range of people working from various disciplines would confuse and dilute the insights that might be gained. Indeed, 'splitting' scientists is easier than dividing 'the public'; scientists wear their membership of the culturally, economically and politically distinct 'tribes' (Abbott 1998 (Abbott , 2001 Gieryn, 1999; Knorr-Cetina, 1999 ) on their lab coats.
The risks, rewards, and practicalities of public engagement also vary tremendously between specialisms. When we talk about the PUS, what do we mean (Michael, 1992) when science is no single thing (Gieryn, 1999) ? We can easily see that, for example, publics' attitudes towards theoretical physics are not the same as publics' attitudes towards fields of research that employ animal experimentation. Different sciences have different relationships with certain invested 'publics' -patients, workers, consumers, protestors, etc. Given this, it is no surprise that we should expect scientists from different fields of work to have very different -and often contradictoryattitudes and understandings of publics, public understanding and public engagement. This paper though argues that the level of resolution required to understand the attitudes of 'scientists' towards public engagement and communication needs to be particularly fine; our example of the distinct views of psychiatric geneticists would likely be obscured in general surveys of 'geneticists' or 'psychiatrists', and certainly would be invisible to studies using categories such as 'biology' or 'biomedicine'. This paper therefore considers the single field of psychiatric genetics. Psychiatric genetics has a history of political controversy and, when viewed by outsiders, scientific failure. This leads to particular attitudes towards engagement with distinct publics: patients, politicians, medical and psychiatric practitioners, scientific funders, and the 'general public'. Using interviews with leading scientists working in the field, the paper explores the way in which this sub-group of scientists understand publics and public engagement.
Why Do Scientists Engage?
Efforts to boost public understanding of / engagement with science have been part of United Kingdom science policy for the last three decades (Haran 2011; Miller, 2001 ).
The 'Bodmer Report' (The Royal Society, 1985) argued that, in a democratic society, public opinion is a major influence in science policy decision-making, and that an uninformed public would be vulnerable to misleading (and unscientific) ideas.
Individuals would not only make 'personal' choices on the basis of these beliefs, but these ideas would affect their attitudes as citizens towards policy. The report recommended that the Royal Society should make improving the public understanding of science one of its major priorities.
Despite this 'watershed moment' (Ziman, 1991) , between 1985 and the 'Science and Society' report (House of Lords, 2000) there appeared to be little change in 'scientific literacy' (Miller, 2001) . Furthermore, the implicit argument justifying much public understanding of science policy: that increased understanding of science leads to increased public acceptance of science and the products and policies based on science, has not been supported by surveys of public opinion (Weldon, 2004) . The so-called 'deficit model' of public understanding of science appeared to be failing to deliver (Gross, 1994; Miller, 2001 ) and thus became a target for social-scientific critique (Stilgoe, 2007) .
The deficit model assumes that negative public attitudes towards science are the result of a knowledge deficit that can be corrected by providing the public with more scientific information. Critics of this approach proposed models of public understanding and engagement -based on dialogue that take account of the ways in which people use, define, and make sense of science (Irwin and Wynne, 1996; Miller, 2001) . It follows that such approaches to PUS must consider 'publics' rather than 'the public' since different groups engage with and understand science in different ways (Renn, 2006; Turney, 1996) . Despite these arguments and criticisms (Irwin and Michael, 2003) , large-scale surveys designed to capture the attitudes of 'the public' dominate official reports on the public understanding of science (see, for example, Besley and Nisbet, 2013; Ipsos MORI, 2011) .
Notwithstanding its criticisms, the Bodmer Report led to increasing encouragement for scientific fields to open up to the public (Haran, 2012) . Although the language might have since shifted (Miller, 2001) , 30 years on the call for scientists to engage with publics has never been louder (Barnett et al. 2012; Bauer, Allum and Miller, 2007; Davies, 2008; Poliakoff and Webb, 2007; Wilsdon and Willis, 2004 ; ) . In the UK, funding bodies such as the Medical Research Council (MRC) encourage their scientists to communicate and discuss their work with public groups, with such activities commonly described as public engagement (Research Council United Kingdom, 2013) .
In UK academic science, public engagement or (PEST) -the Public Engagement with Science and Technology (Irwin, Jensen and Jones, 2013) is no longer merely an abstract civic responsibility; it is also a metric considered when allocating research funding (Pearson, 2001) . Today, universities have a 'duty' to communicate with the public and to engage with public groups and non-expert communities (Times Higher Education, 2009 i . This has led to academic departments investing in public engagement, which is understood by some institutions as a pathway to (or synonymous with) impact (Ponting, 2011; Watermeyer, 2012) . Prestigious prizes are awarded to those who promote the public understanding of science and funding applications have sections to complete on public engagement. Accordingly, with the terms and conditions under which science is produced, circulated, and accredited changing (Porter, et al., 2012) , explorations of the ways in which 'scientists' conceptualise ideas of 'the public' and 'publics', and their motivations to 'engage' is particularly timely (Davies, 2008: Poliakoff and Webb, 2007; Stilgoe, 2007) .
The Challenge for Psychiatry and Psychiatric Genetics
Psychiatric genetics -and its public profile -has particular characteristics that distinguish it from other fields of biomedicine. These differences are not only scientific -psychiatric illnesses are difficult to diagnose, and such diagnoses are unlikely to map directly onto biological categories (Burmeister, McInnes and Zöllner, 2008; Morgan, McKenzie and Fearon, 2008; Green, 2014 ) -but also politicalgovernments have a history of misusing and abusing both psychiatry and notions of biological heritability (Propping, 2005; Kerr and Shakespeare, 2002) . Psychiatric genetics has inherited a controversial history from its parent disciplines (ArribasAyllon, Bartlett and Featherstone, 2010; Sedgwick, 1982; Turney and Turner, 2000) .
As Propping (2005) writes 'The false doctrine of eugenics and its practical application by the Nazi regime paved the way for the development of a prevailing anxiety in society that psychiatric genetics might lead to stigmatisation or even a revitalisation of eugenics' (p2).
Yet there is optimism in psychiatric genetics, arising from the belief that mental illnesses are understandable in biological terms and, therefore, medically tractable (Craddock and Owen, 2010; Kauffman, Johnson and Pardes, 1996; Stoltenberg and Burmeister, 2000) . Writing about the new genetics in general, Kerr, CunninghamBurley and Amos (1997) have illustrated that, with these visions of the past and the future co-existing in the present, geneticists tend to clearly demarcate the 'eugenic past', in which information about heredity was put to use by the state, from a future in which individuals and families use genomic information for their own benefit.
The way in which psychiatric geneticists present a narrative of their discipline is therefore important, with current perceptions of psychiatry and psychiatric genetics ambivalent at best. Smith (2008) argues that few people, apart from psychiatrists, care about the practice of psychiatry. Yet they should, he argues, as the burden of mental illness is enormous. Treating mental illness accounts for 10.8% (£10.4 billion per year) of the National Health Service budget (Department of Health, 2010) , While the cost of work-related mental ill health is estimated to be another £30 billion per year (Centre for Mental Health, 2010) . Some doubt that psychiatry will ride to the rescue, arguing that advances in treating psychiatric disorders have been rare (Hamer, 2002) .
However, the argument that these sorts of statistics demand that psychiatry should be of public interest, is not only (or even at all) a high-minded argument that 'the public'
should be able to play their part as citizens (Irwin, 2001) , but that psychiatry needs a public. Disciplines need public and political support else they become marginalised.
Public engagement in psychiatry should therefore be constituted in a way that would both serve a common good and maintain the standing of the profession (Smith, 2008) .
In psychiatric genetics, scientists face the added challenge of genetic stigmatisation (Propping, 2005) . Stigma is widely recognised as one of the biggest obstacles to mental healthcare (Sartorius, 2007) , and efforts to understand and reduce stigmatising attitudes are central to many public programmes that deal with mental health (Time to Change, 2010 Change, , 2011 . However, there is the fear that the geneticisation of mental illness could reinforce stigma (Goldacre, 2010; Rose, 1998) . In the accounts on public engagement provided by psychiatric geneticists in this paper, references to stigma feature prominently, with a 'deficit model' understanding of the role of public engagement common -informing the public of the genetics of mental illness will reduce stigma, bringing public attitudes in line with the attitudes of the scientists.
However, while researchers speak of public engagement as a means to tackle the 'stigma' of mental illness, we find that they also refer to the 'stigma' that they face as psychiatrists and as psychiatric geneticists. Researchers express concerns regarding the standing of psychiatry and psychiatric genetics within medicine and the effect this has on spoiling (Goffman, 1963) their professional identity. As we have described, the history of the politicisation of both psychiatry (see Crossley, 2006 for psychiatry and social movements), and genetics has left its mark on the field. Propping described the way in which this 'sinister history' hangs over the field as if it were 'Damocles'
sword' (Joseph, 2006, p151; Propping, 2005, p3) . More, unlike some other branches of research into the genetics of illnesses, psychiatric genetics has a history of failing to meet optimistic predictions for the identification of 'genes for…' And further still, regardless of advances in genetics, from Genome Wide Association Studies (GWAS)
to Next-Generation Sequencing (NGS), psychiatric genetics struggles to a far greater degree with classification and, relatedly, the identification of biomarkers, than 'somatic' illnesses. Against this background, psychiatric genetics must engage with the public.
The Centre: the Research Setting
This paper focusses on a single, internationally significant, laboratory -the Centre.
The Centre includes laboratory-based and clinical researchers, conducting genetics and genomics research to understand the biological causes of mental illness. The paper draws on empirical evidence from two inter-related research projects at the Centre conducted between 2009 and 2012. As such, the research can be considered a case study (Thomas, 2011) .
The first project (2009-2010) was a small-scale qualitative study consisting of nine interviews with senior academics, both clinicians and laboratory scientists, heavily involved in public engagement. The project explored scientists' understandings of publics and their reasons for 'engaging'. The authors did not define 'publics' for the interview participants; interview participants chose which groups to discuss as publics and with which psychiatric genetics needed to engage.
The second project (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) consisted of 20 interviews with scientists at the Centre. Respondents were a mix of early-career and senior researchers. The focus of the project was to explore the work practices of the field of psychiatric genetics as it became a 'big science' (Authors; Arribas-Ayllon, Bartlett and Featherstone, 2010; Sullivan, 2011) .
In addition to interview data, ethnographic research informs the analyses of this paper.
Author 2 spent time in the Centre's laboratories, and attended seminars and conferences with members of the Centre. Author 1 was employed by the Centre as a sociologist, with additional public engagement duties. Not being a psychiatric geneticist, his position granted him a level of critical distance. To a degree, Author 1 can be said to have been performing inadvertent participatory action research (Whyte, 1991) , organising public engagement activities for psychiatric genetics/geneticists while thinking critically and sociologically about publics and engagement.
The Centre itself has played important roles in GWAS of mental illness. This type of research is 'big science' (Hevly, 1992) . Large-scale science requires significant resources; technical, economic, cultural and social, the maintenance of which often requires support from specific 'publics'. In particular, this kind of research into human health requires access to research participants -people with psychiatric disorders. Successful research therefore demands the support of people with psychiatric disorders, along with their families, carers, and medical professionals.
From the research participants material of scientific value is extracted -which in psychiatric genetics includes not only DNA but also detailed mental health histories derived from case notes and in-depth face-to-face interviews. Unlike most 'somatic'
illnesses, detailed phenotypic data can only be collected by engaging with the research participant's subjectivity. There are no convenient biological markers for disorders such as schizophrenia. Further, given that psychiatric geneticists are wary of treating disorders such as schizophrenia as if they are mapped one-to-one onto a single underlying biology, it is considered important to collect detailed phenotypic data as a way of tackling the phenotypic and (presumed) biological heterogeneity of the disorder ii . Public engagement is seen as one way to promote and help recruit participants to these projects.
The imperatives and demands involved in public engagement with psychiatric genetics (and other big biomedical projects) are therefore distinct from those that figure in some other scientific fields. The Centre has to invest in its publics in order to do research. As part of this investment, in 2009, the Centre launched a public engagement programme, designed to engage with a variety of publics. This paper explores how scientists at the Centre conceptualise the public, their reasons for engaging with publics, and the messages they want to communicate. Interview extracts have been anonymised, with details of particular programmes of research omitted.
The Publics of Psychiatric Genetics
Studies in the public understanding of science show us that we should not think of the public as a homogenous group, but rather that we should think of publics as they relate to science (Renn, 2006; Wynne, 1995) . Unsurprisingly, scientists at the Centre have publics that they prioritise. We can separate these publics into four types. The first group is 'the general public'.
"Who do I think my public is? I suppose I would like to think there [are] several. Obviously there's the kind of general public, the people reading newspapers and magazines, and watching television […] I would like to get across to them" (Professor Norris).
To this 'general public', scientists at the Centre want to convey general messages about the science and the (potential) impact of research.
"[…]
The more general message is about the importance of research in mental health and the stigma and understanding illness and complexity and that is really, I think, aimed at the very widest possible spectrum of the public"
(Professor Davidson).
These general messages cover ground which includes developments in understandings of the brain, the stigma of mental illness, and the complexity of psychiatric research.
Professor Stevenson's description of the messages that she wants to communicate is typical.
"I don't think the public thing [has] moved on [from] complex disease, genes being deterministic. I think the other thing [… for] people to realise [is]
that…for these sorts of studies we're only capturing a very limited type of genetic variation. There's still loads of genetic research to go on before we're capturing all the variation. And of course there's non-inherited factors […] These complexities have got environmental contributions, [especially] for some of the disorders we're studying". (Professor Stevenson).
Getting across to the public the complexity in psychiatric genetics is seen as a priority.
As well as the message that there will be no 'gene for' discoveries, Professor
Stevenson stresses that it is also important to communicate the incomplete nature of the science and that there is still more research to be done.
While the messages will be different between disciplines, every scientific discipline has a 'general public'. Although we see how issues specific to psychiatric genetics are raised when discussing engagement with the general public (for instance, stigma and complexity), the differences between scientific specialisms become pronounced when specific publics are considered. We will discuss three of psychiatric genetics most prominent publics; people with mental illnesses, medical professionals, and policy makers.
Psychiatric genetics requires the participation of people with psychiatric conditions in order for research to be done. In psychiatric genetics, this participation is much more involved than in other large-scale genetics research, for example detailed interviews covering distressing periods in the participants' lives are required. Engaging with this group of people is seen as a priority at the Centre.
"For me -a key group that I think to do some work and to interact with is -is people with psychiatric disorders" (Professor Johnson).
And: Despite all senior staff recognising that people with psychiatric disorders are a key group to engage with there were differences in priority. Professor Johnson points out that the interests of clinicians and those of laboratory scientists can be quite different, and that these differences influence the publics that they wish to engage. According to Barker (2004) , the language of engagement 'suggests an element of reciprocal and collaborative knowledge production… [that requires] collaboration with communities in the production of knowledge' (p 126). Psychiatric geneticists work within the wider worlds of psychiatry and healthcare. Even if one were to suggest that these groups should not properly be thought of as publics and more as critical audiences, the fact is that scientists at the Centre understood healthcare professionals as a public to engage with in their public engagement programme.
Therefore an exploration of scientists' understanding of publics and public engagement must consider this. Note also the assumption that informing publics of the findings of psychiatric genetics will reduce stigma -this is a recurrent theme in the interviews.
The final priority group are policy makers. While 'the public' might, in theory, support research through taxation, it is politicians and policy makers who decide on the details and distributions. This is true of any science, no matter how distant its content is from the concerns of state and civil society. Psychiatric genetics, however, as with all biomedical science, promises findings of significance to policy makers.
"Then I suppose there are the sorts of people who influence policy and so on."
(Professor Norris)
And:
"The more general message is about the importance of research in mental health and the stigma and understanding illness and complexity that's really Politicians and policy makers (and the 'general public') are targets for engagement as they are the funders of science. All sciences need to maintain political support (Yearley, 2005) . As a biomedical science though, psychiatric genetics also needs to engage more specific publics who might use the content of their research. Most specifically, psychiatric genetics needs to engage with a public consisting of people with psychiatric disorders. Public engagement at the Centre is understood as a way to attract participants by communicating the value, purpose, and promise of the science.
Public engagement is, therefore, in no small part understood as an activity that maintains the resources required to do science.
The Promise of Psychiatric Genetics
The promise of psychiatric genetics is that mental illnesses will be rendered diseases like any other. Not only will mental illness be understandable biologically, and medically tractable, but the stigma specifically associated with mental illness will be undone.
"I am very keen to persuade people that psychiatric disorders are tractable to scientific approaches which I don't think that everybody believes. I think […] there is a prevailing view now in society and amongst politicians that they're untreatable, chronic conditions that require social care and the main thing that I want to get across to people is that these [...] severe psychiatric disorders are disorders of the brain that can be approached by genetics and neurosciences and that that is the way to develop new treatments." (Professor Norris).
A short history of classifications in psychiatry is important here. The current psychiatric classificatory system, based on grouping disorders together by common patterns of symptoms, owes much to the 19th century psychiatrist, Emil Kraepelin.
However, the usefulness of the Kraepelinian classificatory system has recently been called into question (Jablensky, 1999; Craddock and Owen, 2007; Craddock and Owen, 2010) .
These questions may precede a paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1970) in psychiatry. Psychiatric geneticists anticipate that a better understanding of the biology of mental illnessderived from techniques such as GWAS, NGS, and brain imaging -will produce diagnoses that better match the underlying biology and, as Professor Norris describes, improved treatments. The system used to classify psychiatric disorders will be aligned with that of other medical fields (Singh and Rose, 2009 A wide variety of medical conditions have been stigmatised at one time or another (Scambler, 1998 (Scambler, , 2009 ), but the stigma of mental illnesses appears particularly damaging and resilient (Goffman, 1968; MacRae, 1999) . Professor Norris describes a past in which people were too ashamed to even say the word 'cancer'. Many cancers were untreatable, fatal conditions. The medical profession waged 'war i ' on the disease, and the improved understanding and treatment of cancer, led, so Professor Norris argues, to a reduction in stigmatising attitudes. Within psychiatry, Professor Norris points to Alzheimer's disease as a case in which increased knowledge has led to optimism for future treatments and, in doing so, reduced the associated stigma.
Professor Norris's account is that of a therapeutic optimist. Mental illness is a disease like any other. They are biologically tractable, which will lead to treatments. In turn, this will reduce stigmatising attitudes. This makes the basis for an appeal for public support and the maintenance of the resources required for research. These arguments privilege the power of scientific knowledge to change society. Therapeutic pessimists, by contrast, are likely to prioritise discussions of the role of the history, culture, and politics of mental illness and stigma.
i The metaphor of waging war on a disease is commonplace in biomedicine (Gwyn, 2002; Vincent, 2007 who need to know about it. Now how much benefit they'll get out of it in that short time frame is a different matter. But it would be good for people to have a feeling of optimism that the cure is not round the corner, there may never be the cure, but that there was at least some kind of momentum" (Professor Edwards).
Professor Edwards tempers the linear optimism of 'research knowledge treatment' by saying; 'there may never be the cure'. Nonetheless, this account is still that of a therapeutic optimist who sees in public engagement an opportunity to spread this optimism. All science (Haran, 2011) involves telling stories about a potential future; not all have to deal with a past containing abuses and unfulfilled promises. Psychiatric geneticists often rely on drawing a comparison with other branches of biomedicine that are free from such troubled histories.
An Illness Like Any Other…
At the Centre, comparisons between psychiatric genetics and cancer research are not limited to the standing of the fields and the stigma associated with the conditions.
Centre members also draw parallels between the role of genetics in cancer and mental illness. The Centre's expertise lies in conducting genetic research to discover susceptibility genes for psychiatric disorders. Susceptibility genes increase the risk, sometimes by a very small degree, of developing a disease. The model of genetic contribution to common mental illness is understood to one of many genes, each of small effect. This is unlike the classical Mendelian genetics with which the public are familiar, in which a mutation in a single gene plays a major role in determining whether or not a person develops a disease. When Centre members face public audiences, they make comparisons to the genetics of diabetes, heart disease, cancer, Professor Davidson's account paints a clear picture of the particular challenges that psychiatric genetics faces when trying to engage with the public. Not only is there resistance to the very idea that psychiatric disorders are 'illnesses', but there are very different reactions to the genetic explanations for psychiatric disorders than for 'somatic' illnesses iv . Again, this points to a need to consider scientists' attitudes towards public engagement at the very 'local' scale -the particular challenges facing psychiatric geneticists are not generalisable to other biomedical geneticists, much less the life sciences as a whole.
That something is 'genetic' means something different in these 'public' places than it does in the laboratory. There is no 'gene for' the disorders that the Centre researchas with most things in psychiatric genetics it is a lot more complicated than that (Arribas-Ayllon, Bartlett and Featherstone, 2010; Sullivan, Daly, and O'Donovan, 2012) . In the laboratory, that everyone understands the caveats that spring from the complexity of the genetics under discussion can be taken for granted. A non-specialist audience, Professor Davidson fears, hears 'genetic' as 'gene for'. Despite recognising that the findings could have been better communicated, Professor Davidson maintains that if the story had been about a physical illness there would be no controversy. And, possibly, no 'story', in the journalistic sense, a fact that reminds us that in order to engage with a public an audience is needed. Therefore, when scientists engage with the public they must deal with the existing understandings of their science (Turney, 1996) . For each science the existing understandings are different, presenting diverse challenges to public engagement. While some scientists at the Centre accept that stigmatising attitudes are not simply the product of a belief that psychiatric disorders are not biological in origin, the belief that stigma will be diminished by the discovery of the biological basis of mental illness is widespread. Professor Edwards is an exception: "There's that type of stigma, they are rotten to the core, or their parents were rotten to the core, and stuff like that. And I suppose it is imagined that a greater understanding, you know, that these are not necessarily disorders of personal
[circumstances] could in principle reduce stigma. However there's also stigma and prejudice against people who have biological illnesses that are fully understood.
[…] Actually I don't believe that a reduction in stigma necessarily follows from a greater understanding of cause.
[…] We know the causes of Aids, we know the causes of venereal diseases.
[…] At the core of all this, it's true that a greater understanding does not necessarily abolish stigma, and I'm not convinced it will increase it, but it just does not follow it will reduce it" (Professor Edwards).
Reviewing the literature, on mental illness and stigma, Goldacre (2010) 'physical illnesses' might be useful, but given that research has shown that in developed societies stigma is typically attached to conditions of the mind rather than the body (Albrecht, Walker and Levy 1982) , it is not a like-for-like model in so far as using public engagement to de-stigmatise mental illness goes.
Stigmatised Psychiatric Genetics (Therapeutic Optimists and Social Optimists)
Scientists at the Centre, as scientists elsewhere, understand public engagement is at least partly a means of maintaining access to the resources required to do science.
Public engagement, by presenting optimistic futures, is seen as a way to secure public and political support. It is also seen as a means of recruiting research participants.
However, as we have seen, there is also a more high-minded purpose; to reduce the stigma of mental illness.
However, while scientists at the Centre begin by speaking of the stigma of mental illness and their hope that public engagement, founded on their therapeutic optimism, might begin to reduce stigma, we also see the concept of stigma used to describe attitudes towards psychiatry and psychiatric genetics. According to centre members it is not just those with psychiatric conditions who are the victim of negative attitudes, but also those who work in psychiatry. Through a process of marking (Hess, 1992; Simon, 1999) , psychiatry is presented as being seen as not quite a 'real' medicine by the wider medical community spoiling the identity of psychiatrists as medics (see Goffman, 1963) .
really is a joke when you are a medical student. You know, I
mean, people really put you off it. I think there is stigma. At medical school you get it and then afterwards, you know, people say but you weren't one of the weird ones" (Professor Stevenson).
Yet, while psychiatry is positioned at the margins of medicine, it appears that psychiatric genetics is regarded with suspicion by the psychiatrists precisely for its 'scientism' (though the history of the disciplines concerned no doubt plays into these attitudes it's important that the people out there will need to implement those advances." (Professor Johnson).
Professor Davidson also posits that psychiatric genetics is given short shrift within psychiatry because many psychiatrists are ideologically opposed to the application of genetics to questions of mental illness. A 'theoretical abhorrence', as he puts it, though does not explore what it is about the histories of psychiatry and genetics that would produce such an attitude.
In fact, scientists at the Centre make it clear that biological approaches to psychiatry are anathema in UK psychiatry.
"I think it's more than genetics. I think it's the biological in psychiatry that's the issue, yeah. And I think people are very wedded still to kind of purely psychological and environmental ways of considering psychiatric illness"
(Professor Johnson,).
Thinking about Professor Johnson's division between those who take a biological approach and those who take a psychosocial approach, we can suggest that the split is not so much between therapeutic optimists and therapeutic pessimists, but between brands of optimism. Those in psychiatry who put the social and environmental at the heart of explanations of mental illness might well be social optimists. Some at the Centre view these people less than favourably. When given the summary of a literature review suggesting that a biological understanding of mental illness may increase stigma, Professor Norris responded. Essentially, therapeutic optimists believe that pharmaceuticals and other 'medical'
treatments can deal with mental illness. It is hard to be a therapeutic optimist unless mental illness is understood biologically. Social optimists believe that mental illness can be tackled by focussing on the social or environmental, at the level of the individual or as a public health issue. It is easiest to think this way if mental illness is understood as the product of social factors. These two 'optimisms' are not necessarily mutually exclusive; being a therapeutic optimist does not demand that one is a social pessimist, and being a therapeutic pessimist does not demand one is a social optimist.
Given Professor Davidson compares the attitudes of UK psychiatrists to the 'therapeutic optimism' of psychiatrists in the United States it is important to briefly consider of the cultural and political differences between the countries. That the UK has a universal health care system, a welfare state, and a strong 'social democratic' strain to its politics, which are absent or much less pronounced in the US, provides the bedrock on which social optimism might be founded. Again, when considering the ways in which scientists think about publics and public engagement, this asks us to consider the particular context of the science in question.
Discussion
This paper is, first a demonstration that the social, political, and economic context of a particular scientific field influences the way in which scientists understand publics and public engagement. Specific scientific fields have distinctive publics. They engage with these different publics for different purposes: enrolling them for research, soliciting support from interest groups, promoting the specialism and its research to policy makers and stakeholders etc. Studies of 'science' and 'scientists' obscure this variation, just as studies of 'the public' hide the way in which important publics engage with science.
Second, this paper is about psychiatric genetics, and shows the way in which scientists involved in psychiatric genetics use the language of 'stigma' in a range of ways to justify public engagement. Most obviously, there is a belief in a 'deficit model' of stigma -that stigmatizing attitudes are the result of insufficient knowledge of the genetic (and therefore biological) causes of psychiatric disorders. 'Stigma' is also co-opted to do rhetorical work within medicine and science, marking differences in therapeutic optimism and outlook as pathological. Psychiatric geneticists are therapeutic optimists, who see themselves opposing a society dominated by therapeutic pessimism. This pessimism extends to the wider medical profession, which we see when scientists working in psychiatric genetics talk of their field as being stigmatized as well. Not only is psychiatry a poor relation to other branches of medicine, but psychiatric genetics is marginalised when compared to other large scale genetic studies of complex disease. And, quite aside from any 'disciplinary sneer', with regard to wider publics, both psychiatry and genetics have identities that have been 'spoiled' by their troubled, controversial histories. As psychiatric geneticists, they often feel overshadowed by their discipline's controversial past -the stigmata that marks their membership of a 'shamed caste' (Goffman, 1963) .
It is not surprising, therefore, that psychiatric geneticists justified public engagement as a means to tackle negative attitudes towards psychiatric genetics as well as a tool to reduce the stigma of mental illness. Familiar with the language of stigma, psychiatric geneticists use the term in a variety of ways; people with mental illness are stigmatized, psychiatry is stigmatized, psychiatric genetics is stigmatized, therapeutic optimists are stigmatized. Public engagement in which a programme of informing different groups of the biological basis of mental illness is posited as a means to reduce these 'stigmas' invokes the 'deficit model', relying on the argument that if people outside the specialism knew more their attitudes would come to be more like those of the specialists.
That the particular attitudes towards publics and public engagement held by psychiatric geneticists are not to be understood as directly transferrable to other areas of science it part of the point of this paper. These attitudes are the product of the historical, social and cultural context of the field, pointing to the necessity that studies of scientists' attitudes towards publics and public engagement need to be studies of particular groups of scientists. Even if these studies do not explore the historical, social and cultural context of the field, its economics and its institutional specifics, the relative homogeneity of the group under study will produce informative results (even if these are not explained). The specificity of this paper is then its strength -the generalisable aspect of this paper is that fine grained specificity is a necessity in understanding scientists' conceptions of publics and public engagement, taking seriously Levy-Leblond's (1992) call for more sophisticated approaches to studying the relationship between scientists and the public. The degree of focus does not prevent some of the insights from this paper being applied more broadly, with the caveat that differences in scientific culture do matter (Gieryn 1999) .
issues addressed by the science in question should not be considered publics. This would include patients, carers, politicians with responsibility for health care, etc., and would mean that 'public engagement' would most often be limited to engagement with groups with no discernible stake in the issues at hand. Of course, it may be the case that in some disciplines medical professionals might be considered disciplinary peers of those conducting basic research -for example, in the case of cancer genetics it might very well be the case that oncologists are assumed to possess expertise in genetics that psychiatrists are presumed to lack. This adds weight to our argument that the resolution required to understand scientists' attitudes towards public engagement and communication needs to be particularly fine.
iv Psychiatric disorders have been, and continue to be, discussed in terms of 'character' and 'morality' in ways that 'somatic' illnesses are not.
